Mr. Frank Daly:

I don't think they had a particularly full handle on it. I think we saw it from the documentation and when we began to engage with debtors ... and this was particularly so in relation to the non-NAMA banks because we had a ... we had ... we were able to collate a full picture of the lending across the NAMA banks. But you had the situation where when we looked for business plans, when we began to assess the debtors that came across to us from the NAMA banks, you suddenly discovered this exposure to the non-NAMA institutions. I don't think that the NAMA banks, or indeed the other ones, had a particular full view right across the spectrum of lending by individual debtors. And I'm not ... I don't want to make a generalisation; I'm just saying that it was there to a very large extent. There may have been some cases or some banks where they had a better handle on that than others. I think it was part of this ... the kind of culture of: "Well let's not dig too deeply here. We have the money, here's a proposition, it sounds good, it's property related, property is on the up; everybody is saying that there's never going to be real crash, at worst it'll be a soft landing." So the temptation was there.