Mr. Paul Brophy:

In 2013, the strategy of the supermarkets was simply to increase footfall and they slashed and burned to do so. It became a race to the bottom, with prices dropping from 39 cent to 29 cent, to 19 cent, to 9 cent and finally to 5 cent per pack or kilo of product, and the supermarkets all followed each other. The strategy backfired in the end and led to a backlash because people knew it was devaluing all the products. In 2014, when prices came down, the strategy was slightly different. The supermarkets started a tendering process whereby producers were asked to tender for their price. A lot of growers here would not deal directly with all the supermarkets but would deal through a consolidator. The consolidator would bring them a portfolio of products which could include, for example, ten fruit items and two vegetable items. It is then open to them to tender for the products but the supermarkets tend to play one against the other to get the best value going forward. That had a more upsetting effect on prices in 2014.

It was due to pressure on the part of the IFA and other organisations that the supermarkets did not adopt the strategy of cutting the prices to ridiculously low levels. That was the answer to what happened in 2013. However, there was some wastage and there was not the same degree of uplift in sales because the volumes were not sold and importers had product in. We were led to believe that there were significant losses on the part of the retailers and some of the importers of product that was lined up to be brought in. When the price was not there, the customer was not there. That was the effect in 2014.