Professor Jennifer Todd:

I thank members very much for their excellent questions. I am not sure if I can answer all of them in the way members expect. In terms of immigrants, incomers and freedom of movement across the border, it is the case that immigration is a major concern in the UK. That is something I have thought about but on which I do not have clear answers, except that the Nordic Council set up in 2014 a freedom of movement body which is certainly one that we should look at fairly closely in the event of BrExit. The Nordic Council is one year or two years ahead in terms of thinking about how to organise movement between, for example, Finland and Iceland or Norway and Sweden.

As Senator Hayden said, there are big differences between the Nordic Council and any British-Irish situation, not least because of the imbalance of size and power between Britain and Ireland as opposed to the Nordic countries, but on the other hand the cross-learning is something we can very productively do. I will go through the questions and then perhaps come back to some of the issues.

On Northern Ireland politicians and what they are thinking about all of this, my sense is that they are not thinking about it. I was at a conference in the North not that long ago where the general perspective was that nobody in the North is talking about the issue.

They are not preparing. Maybe they are and they are not telling anyone, but my sense is that there has been less discussion in the North than in the South about it even though it will have a major impact on the North.

While Northern Ireland is stable, it is unstably stable. It is a Nationalist-Unionist dualism. The Good Friday Agreement has achieved a great deal, but the system is still fragile, as we have seen in the past two or three years. As a way of dealing with that fragility, addressing North-South relations constructively and strengthening them within the sovereignty restraints of the Good Friday Agreement can only be positive.

I will revert to a number of the other questions in a moment, but I was asked whether there was any point in doing something or whether I would argue more for proactivity than other witnesses. In terms of North-South relations, it is always important to be proactive. I am not an economist, so I am much less certain about proactivity in terms of the cost to the State of BrExit and the ensuing economic policies. In the context of North-South relations, however, it is clear that the cost to this State of instability in the North would be very high, and proportionately higher than it would be to Britain. The North is one of this State's vital interests. Therefore, we must be proactive in our North-South relations.

As to what could replace North-South or British-Irish institutions in the event of BrExit, how to compensate for North-South contacts and how to counteract this within the UK, what I have tried to outline in my paper is that Northern Ireland has been constitutionally anomalous within the UK since at least 1985 and the Anglo-Irish Agreement, although one could argue that it has been so for even longer. It is understood as such within the UK. Therefore, British Governments are likely to be more open to negotiating flexible relationships between North and South than they might be between Finchley and Dublin. This is something that successive Irish Governments negotiated throughout the 1990s. It could be pushed further, as both the Conservatives and Labour would be open to it in principle. As to what those relationships should be, Mr. Garret FitzGerald commented at one point in the 1980s to the effect that the South could represent Northern farmers at the EU. That remains more a thinking statement than a policy suggestion. However, there are common interests in the farming community and an openness, albeit at the edges, within Britain to negotiating. For the British state, peace and stability in the North are worth considerable amounts of expenditure and creativity. It is worth considering what creative negotiations can take place on North-South issues, including those relating to the EU, between Britain and Ireland. This should be done at the highest possible level because that is what is required, but other discussions can take place in organisations such as the British-Irish Parliamentary Assembly, the North-South Ministerial Council and so on. We must start airing the possibility of more innovative relationships in the event of BrExit, but also more generally.

As to what the replacement institutions following BrExit could be, walking backwards in Europe would be a catastrophe, but it would also be a catastrophe if we walked backwards in respect of conflicts. Since 1945, most settlements across the world have failed. Most conflicts do not even end in settlement, but in victory or defeat. We must be particularly careful, as walking backwards on one matter can lead to a more generalised walking backwards.

I was asked whether the State could benefit from BrExit. From the 1950s and 1960s onwards, the State has skilfully balanced relationships with Britain, Europe and the US. If BrExit happens, that is presumably what the State will continue doing. As to how we might benefit from BrExit in terms of our access to the European market, Northern Ireland's access to that market is something about which we cannot do much with Britain, but about which we can do a great deal with the North. We should be thinking along those lines. This does not answer the large questions about the cost to this State of BrExit, but one of the points I was trying to make was that the cost to us and the British of going backwards on the Northern Ireland settlements would be high. As this must be avoided, it is a negotiating point.

As to whether there is any point in us doing anything, the answer is "Yes" in respect of North-South relations and enlivening the Good Friday, peace or settlement process. The metaphor used in the 1990s was of having to keep the momentum going, as otherwise one would fall off the bicycle. In some respects, the momentum has slowed a great deal in recent years. It must resume. It will only slow further if BrExit happens.

We should consider the Nordic model carefully and ask experts to discuss how it might be used. It cannot simply be plonked down and applied uncritically, but it can be discussed.

How to negotiate in respect of immigrants remains a difficult issue, and one for which I do not have a simple answer. Freedom of movement is important. If immigrants are being stopped at the Border, so is everyone else. Border constituencies have benefited from the Good Friday Agreement and the easing of Border controls and customs checking. I have undertaken a great deal of research into everyday life in Border areas. In 2004, people in the Louth area, for example, were still quite distrustful of themselves or of North-South relations.

By 2014, a sense of openness had developed. Everybody to whom we spoke was very positive about that sense of openness. For the first time in their lives the Border did not matter and they were able to speak to people to whom they had never before spoken as they were seen as political opponents. People were very positive about this. Places like Castle Saunderson, the Ulster Canal, the Cavan County Museum and small community groups in the North benefitted from Special European Union Programmes Body, SEUPB, funding. Small community groups, small museums and so on have a cumulative affect on relationships across the Border and on sectarian relationships. These are areas in which there could be a fall-off in terms of EU funding if Britain exits the EU.