Mr. Conor Elliott:

There is a government. There is a president, which is Salva Kiir. He terminated – removed from office – many members of that government recently and they have become the heads of the opposition movement in South Sudan. There are government-controlled areas, which are controlled by the Sudan People's Liberation Army, SPLA, the regular army of South Sudan. There are supply lines, towns, and assets – oil fields – that are held by government forces. There are non-government or opposition-held areas in South Sudan that are held by armed elements in the opposition group, but there is a government.

What tends to happen is that the existing governmental structure still remains in place. There have been changes of people in some of the key positions such as state governor or some of the district level positions, depending on whether it is an opposition-held area. Some of that has fallen down ethnically. For example, in some of the opposition-held areas they removed the previous governor or administration and replaced it with their own, but the structures tend to be the same. Obviously, within this type of environment any type of government funding is hugely problematic. There are huge challenges in an effective government because it is very problematic to have government funding flowing into opposition-held areas. This is an issue that we find problematic in some of our work, where there can be barriers put in the way of funds flowing out to things like ministry of health clinics, for example, in opposition-held areas. There is a structure in place. There is a government in place that controls certain areas and the opposition controls opposition-held areas.

Deputy Crowe inquired about the nature of the conflict; whether it is rural or in the communities or what it looks like. It is not in downtown Juba, which is the capital city, today. It was in December. It is however fought largely over urban areas, which are of strategic value, either areas that are on key routes into other countries, close to markets, trade routes or near the oil fields. An example is the town of Malakal, which is close to the oil fields, but which also links Sudan to Ethiopia. Strategic towns are fought over. Malakal is a terrible example. Over the course of several months at the start of the conflict somewhere in the region of 250,000 people who used to be in that town are no longer there. No one has any idea where they are. Malakal was a thriving town but nothing is left but burnt out buildings. There are various villages and towns like that in South Sudan. The conflict tends to be fought over those types of towns, roads and the oil fields, important bridges or strategic assets.

There is a question to be asked and answered about the arming of the conflict and who is supplying weapons. Perhaps we will get into it later. There was a question about cholera in Juba. Cholera is under control there now. That epidemic was dealt with last year, although it continues to be a risk. I think it was in May last year. I am trying to remember exactly when it was. We talked briefly about harvesting and planting.

Deputy Mitchell asked how GOAL's programmes have changed. To be honest, the type of programme we have in South Sudan is largely humanitarian programming. Prior to the conflict in December of 2013, it was the newest country in the world but also the poorest country in the world with appalling indicators, very poor public service infrastructure and poor food security rates. The indicators were very poor. Before the conflict started in December, we were running a very large humanitarian programme. We have changed some of our activities in some of the conflict areas where, for example, we were working with farmers, farmer field schools, agricultural fairs and so on. Those have come to an end but we have rolled out measures like our emergency health care mobile clinics, nutrition activities, water and sanitation projects and expanded them into areas where people have moved from conflict.

We have a new state now, Upper Nile state, in which we operate. Upper Nile is next door to Jonglei, which is one of the primary conflict areas. Many people have left Jonglei and moved into Upper Nile state where we have expanded a very large programme.

Our geography has changed a little. We have scaled up the activities. We have lost some agricultural livelihood activities. The type of activities we undertake are largely the same, but we have many more beneficiaries in new areas.

While the logistics for South Sudan are always very difficult, where we are now in Upper Nile state, particularly in terms of the displaced, there is a community and not much else. There are no services. There is no air strip. There is no clinic; there is nothing. We had seven clinics bombed and destroyed in Upper Nile state. We are currently using mobile clinics. There is no infrastructure in many of the areas we are in now. That is a new challenge for us in some ways. We have had to build our own air strips. We have had to clear fields for helicopter landing areas, so the logistical challenges are more difficult for us now than they were previously. That is why the United Nations support with the World Food Programme, WFP, is so important for us in the region. We always charter our own aircraft, but every time we charter an aircraft it costs approximately $7,000. That flies one tonne of food into an area, but that is gone in a couple of days. We are constantly flying in items, which makes our operations extremely expensive. Our operations in South Sudan are the most expensive operations we have anywhere.

We are trying to compensate for the UN's inability to fund, deliver and put those air assets in place. We are chartering private charters and flying things in, which is a phenomenally expensive way of operating, but it is the only way to get that food, medicines and so on into those areas. A properly resourced UN response in-country would negate the need for that and would be cheaper because we would not be paying premium private sector rates to commercial actors.

Deputy Byrne asked why 90% of the people in the camps in Gambella are women and children. That is a very good point because we know that the number of those under 18 in the camps is extremely high. I think there are 196,000 refugees now in Gambella of whom approximately 90% are women and children, and a very high proportion of those are children under 18. Some of them are caught up in the conflict, but many men stayed behind to try to secure their field and harvest and to protect their family's agricultural land. Many people stay behind and try to look after the family holdings and so on in South Sudan. That tends to be a big issue where many of the male population remain and the women and children cross over into Ethiopia.

Mr. Andrews will respond on the oil question.

I want to come back to the hopelessness issue because it ties into the question about what this committee, and the international community, can do, even what we in GOAL can do. It is about the small areas we can influence that will bring about significant change. Ultimately, this is about politics; it is a political issue. That is the big picture. The most important thing all of us need to do is stay the course. What do we want? We want peace. How do we get that? It is a long, difficult journey. A great deal of coercion and influence is required. Ultimately, we have to influence this from the outside without stepping in and directly doing it. This needs to be a South Sudan solution to a South Sudan problem.

How do we do that internationally as a community? The members are much better versed in that than I am, but we have to stay the course. We have to continue to fund operations like those of GOAL. We must continue to keep people alive while at the same time, through the European Union, at the UN and everywhere we can, using Ireland's foreign policy platform, the reputation Ireland has to persuade and cajole. We need to continue having these types of forum. The committee must continue to invite us back to talk about this issue and, bit by bit, we will try to influence from the outside.

Ultimately, the peace talks with IGAD are where we will see the most likelihood of progress down the road, but there is a huge amount of work to be done. There needs to be an understanding that a South Sudan solution is required. There needs to be a real connection between the grassroots and the political elite. There needs to be truth and reconciliation, a political will and a connection with the people of South Sudan in that solution. All of that is missing currently in the processes that are under way. I hope that answers most of the questions.