Mr. Eric Mamer:

I thank the Chairman. I am delighted to be invited here to present to the committee on European energy policy and, in particular, discuss the links between European energy policy and the Irish context. In view of the time available, I will keep my statement short to leave as much room as possible for debate with the honourable members.

In the invitation the committee sent me, the central issue referred to was the 2030 framework for energy and climate policies. It is indeed topical since the Commission adopted a very important communication on the issue on 22 January 2014, which was only a short time ago. The objective of the Commission's communication was to set out for discussion by Heads of State and Government, the European Parliament, national authorities and parliaments what we consider to be the proper strategy to adopt beyond 2020 looking forward to 2030 in terms of climate and energy policy. Members will remember that in 2008, Heads of State and Government set a framework for 2020.

It set out three targets, one for a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions of 20% compared with 1990, one for the share of renewable energy in European consumption also of 20%; and one for energy efficiency gains compared with a baseline also of 20%. We have now started to gather experience on how policies put in place to reach these targets are functioning and to draw the lessons from that so as to be able to set out the proper framework for 2030.

Hence, following intense discussions in the Commission, the proposal is instead of three targets which are more or less at the same level to have one overriding central target which is greenhouse emission reductions. There the Commission believes that the most efficient scenario in line with reducing greenhouse gas emissions by at least 80% in 2050 is to set the target for 2030 at a 40% reduction compared with 1990 levels.

From that central objective are derived the objectives or targets for the other two areas, or derives an objective for renewable energy. There the Commission proposed to have a target at the level of the European Union of a 27% share of renewable energy in energy consumption. On energy efficiency, for the moment we have not yet set a policy as to whether we should have a target or measures, or a combination of both. However, the communication clearly states that on a path to a 40% emissions reduction we would need to have gains of 20% when it comes to energy efficiency.

These are the kinds of headline figures that are now at the centre of the debate. The member states' parliaments now need to discuss whether this is the appropriate level of ambition and whether this is the appropriate way of going about it because there are significant differences compared with the existing framework to 2020. The central one is that whereas for greenhouse gas emissions we will propose to have binding targets at national level, for renewable energy we will no longer propose to set national targets. We want to see what targets, plans and objectives member states are setting for themselves and adding all those up we wish to reach the 27% renewable energy directive target.

This means that if some member states are very ambitious, others may need to make less of an effort. This recognises that there have been certain difficulties with the current framework. This is because setting a fixed objective by member states for the development of renewable energy has in some instances led to support schemes that are seen as more costly than what could have been achieved based only on strategies that aim at reducing greenhouse gas emissions. This is because we have the ETS market that actually trades these carbon certificates which obviously act as an incentive to produce less CO2 and therefore produce greener electricity, greener heating, etc., which is seen as a natural driver for the increase in renewable energy.

The idea is to focus our attention on greenhouse gas emissions and the rest will be organised in such a way as to reach that central objective. However, why have we said that we need to have at least an EU-level objective for renewable energy? It is because, as the members are very well placed to know, energy is an infrastructure-led business that needs to be organised and planned in particular when it comes to investment. Therefore we cannot leave market actors completely in the dark when it comes to investments that need to be made now for infrastructure that will still be operating in 2030 and beyond. They need to have a clear view of where the European Union is going when it comes to the type of energy that is produced in Europe and hence the 27% renewable energy objective. Why is this set at 27%? It is because in our scenarios 27% is regarded as optimal level of renewable energy required in order to reach the 40% reduction.

Let me add a few words on the other two objectives that are at the forefront of our thinking when it comes to defining the framework for 2030. The first is competitiveness. There have been many complaints from industry and certain quarters of society as to the cost incurred in moving towards this decarbonisation of the European economy and society. Developments outside Europe show that whatever we do there can be developments that lead to an increase in the competitiveness gap between Europe and the rest of the world. This is the whole issue of US shale gas and the effects it is having on US competitiveness and therefore also on investment decisions that are made in favour of sites located in the US to the detriment of European industry.

The second consideration at the forefront of our minds, in particular given the crisis in Ukraine, is security of supply. This is also particularly relevant for Ireland, which is at the top of the league table when it comes to external energy dependency. Having a framework in place that promotes the development of indigenous energy resources can help reduce energy dependency. This is at a time when Europe's own oil and gas resources are progressively declining leaving us increasingly dependent on external energy sources of oil and gas, as we see at the moment in Ukraine, for example, where we can become hostage to geopolitical developments that are largely outside of our control. Developing a policy that allows us at the same time to reduce the energy intensity of our economy and our society and develop our own indigenous energy resources is very positive and needs to be supported.

Another advantage is that it can lead to a shift in expenditure from imports - we spend €1 billion every day on energy imports - to investments. While these investments are often frontloaded and seem expensive at the beginning, in the long run they can lead to significant savings. This is the sort of general philosophy of the framework we have set out. In March the European Council welcomed the Commission's proposal and has set October as a deadline to come to an agreement on the main characteristics of the framework.

I will stop there and I would be very happy to answer members' questions.