Professor Patrick Honohan:

I will take the questions one by one. Of course public interest directors are appointed by the Minister for Finance. From time to time, I have had occasion to have meetings, usually at their initiation and, occasionally, at my instigation, with public interest directors, more in the early days of the crisis and not so much now. However, these are public interest, not Central Bank, nominees.

Senator Barrett is correct in saying if one has 13,000 restructures out of 127,000 arrears of more than 90 days, there is an awful long way to go.

I refer to 13,000 concluded or confirmed, while some 62,000 are proposed. We know where they are going but we do not really know with half of them. They will be starting down the legal route and, as has been extensively discussed, we hope and expect they will deviate back towards restructuring arrangements. However, the Deputy's numbers are right and there is still a big task ahead. The only question is whether it is fruitful to complain rather than build on what exists.

The Deputy asked a very interesting question about loan-to-value ratios and debt-to-income ratios. These are the tools of choice that I would have thought the Central Bank could bring into play well before the emergence of another property boom. There has not been a need to employ them. Even if property prices jump up in Dublin during most of 2014, it is not representative of a credit-driven set of circumstances. The use of loan-to-value and debt-to-income ratios, which remain controversial worldwide, represents the way to go. Now that there are standards and procedures in Europe for macro-prudential rules, there are ways of saying to Europe we are going to introduce certain measures although they may not be in harmony with those in the rest of Europe. As long as Europe does not say "No", we can do that. This is not a matter for today or tomorrow. I refer to a framework that will need to be created for the long haul.

With regard to the condition of tenants, I will be told that we do not have the power in the Central Bank to restrict the use of rent receivers and the consequences for tenants and that this is governed by other laws. Senator Aideen Hayden suggested that the interpretation I adumbrated was not correct. Perhaps she is correct; perhaps there is something that could and should be done. I take it as an action point to dig further into the issue but I am not optimistic.

On the Setanta case, let me offer some points of information that might be of use. The company had a licence in another part of the European Union and started operating here in 2007. Although the Central Bank had no information about the company's balance sheet and finances, and the fact that it had grown to a sizeable scale, by November 2013 we had become concerned and had some concrete suggestions that there could be problems with this. We drew this to the attention of the Maltese regulatory authorities, and they took a series of actions over the following weeks. That has led to the circumstances in question. We were not behind hand in using the information we had, communicating it to the prudential regulator and getting the action. If we had known earlier, had information earlier and acted earlier, perhaps it would have been a smaller hole. If we had not done anything, it would no doubt have become a bigger hole. It is a partial result. The insurance compensation fund is established under legislation to provide for Irish-based risks. That is a matter for the courts and any change in legislation that might occur. In principle, that is what would be used. It is not a matter for the Central Bank anyway.