Alan Shatter (Dublin South, Fine Gael) | Oireachtas source

Yes. I am advised that is the case - I have not gone searching the web to find it. The security firm, Rits, that has looked at this has advised, first, that it is not correct to say this is technology that can be acquired only by governments.

Second, an issue that arises is that this was presented as if it were some device on the street outside GSOCs’ offices or lurking close to them. I have been told this is a piece of equipment, if it exists, that could be operated within a 2 km to 3 km radius of GSOC’s offices, which when taken with their location means large parts of Dublin city centre. There is no evidence it was focused on GSOC.

When I met Simon O’Brien to go through each of these, I said what I had been told about this kit - which he said to me also - would only access UK network registered mobile telephones. I asked did anyone in the GSCO, including Mr. O'Brien himself, operate on a UK network registered mobile telephone. I was told, “No”. When this matter was before the committee, there was a reference to UK operatives being in GSOC’s building. These were in fact members of Verrimus, an English firm, who had visited the offices. I am not aware of any evidence that anyone tried to organise a surveillance of the operatives who were trying to check out whether there were vulnerabilities in GSOC’s offices.

The problem is that, initially, when one looks at this it raises questions. At the end of it, GSOC itself concluded that there was no definitive evidence of it being under surveillance. The Rits report tells me - this is why it is important these issues are dealt with by a judge - that there is no evidence at all of GSOC being under surveillance. It is not just that there is no definitive evidence. I cannot adjudicate on those or the differences between them.