Michelle Mulherin (Mayo, Fine Gael) | Oireachtas source

I refer to the decision on 8 October 2013 to launch the public interest investigation. GSOC launched that investigation on the basis that such surveillance might have originated in the Garda Síochána and that, if that was the case, a member of the Garda Síochána might have committed an offence. That was on 8 October 2013, but at that stage only two threats had been identified and neither of them was identified as using technology or ICT know-how available only at Government level. Subsequent to this, GSOC identified threat No. 3 between 19 and 20 October 2013. I wonder about the proportionality of GSOC's decision to launch a public interest investigation. Threats No. 1 and No. 2, the Wi-Fi device and the issue with the phone, are not classified as something one would only expect a Government agency to have the capability of doing. Anyone could have done this. For all sorts of weird and wonderful reasons, people may want to hack ICT and computers of Government agencies, Departments and Members in Leinster House. On the basis of these threads, GSOC made a decision to invoke a public interest investigation procedure to examine the Garda Síochána. The evidence available at the time, from what the witnesses have told us, seems lightweight to form the view that such an investigation should be instigated. This investigation requires an examination of Garda activities. Is there more to the decision to launch these investigations of these threats? Is there another reason a sweep was made at this time other than the generality described to us? It is open to that suggestion.