Mr. Andrew Munro:

Thank you very much, Chairman. My colleague, Mr. David Fennell, will deal with the Eurojust proposal, while I and my colleague, Ms Una Murphy, will deal with the proposal regarding a European public prosecutor's office, or EPPO. We have an opening statement on the latter proposal.

The concept of a European public prosecutor's office has been discussed for more than 20 years. The rationale underpinning it is that the Union needs to be able to protect its interests directly as the member states' efforts to prosecute fraud successfully are insufficient.

In the explanatory memorandum to the proposal the Commission states:

The present situation in which the prosecution of offences against the Union's financial interests is exclusively in the hands of the authorities of the member states is not satisfactory and does not sufficiently achieve the objective of fighting effectively against offences affecting the Union budget.

Many of the difficulties faced in tackling cross-border offences in particular can, it is argued, be obviated by having a central body at EU level that is empowered to operate across member states' borders. Article 86 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides for the possibility of an EPPO to investigate and prosecute offences against the Union's financial interests.

In a reflection of the challenging nature of the concept, Article 86 provides for a Council regulation involving a special legislative procedure requiring unanimity. In other words, it is not the ordinary co-decision measure where the Parliament is an equal partner in the legislation. It is also one that does not depend on qualified majority voting; it requires unanimity. In the absence of unanimity among member states, provision is made for the establishment of the EPPO on the basis of enhanced co-operation by at least nine member states.

The proposed regulation is a complex measure with significant implications from a legal and practical perspective for Ireland. Whether we participate in its adoption and implementation, or whether we just interact with the EPPO, if it is established, as a non-participating state, it will be challenging. The proposed regulation would provide for the first time for an authority from outside this State to direct criminal investigations and prosecutions. The model of investigation and prosecution would see the prosecutor, not the police, initiate and manage investigations. The European public prosecutor would, for example, order the arrest and interview of suspects, order that search warrants be sought and executed, etc. This is quite different from the standard Irish model where members of the Garda Síochána initiate and manage investigations and present their findings to the Director of Public Prosecutions, who then decides whether to prosecute.

The issue that has gained most attention in discussions so far at EU level is that of the structure. The Commission's proposal envisages a structure with a European public prosecutor at the centre supported by four Deputies. Each participating member state would nominate European Union delegated prosecutors to carry out most of the front-line work of supervising investigations and managing prosecutions in member states. While European Union delegated prosecutors would wear two hats, that of a national prosecutor and of a European Union prosecutor, it is clear they would be subject to the authority and control of the European public prosecutor. The proposal envisages exclusive competence for the EPPO over offences affecting the financial interests of the Union while also providing for the EPPO to deal with ancillary offences in certain circumstances.

The proposal provides for member states' criminal procedure law to apply in general, yet where provision is made for any matter in the draft regulation, the regulation shall prevail. Of interest in this regard is Article 30 which requires evidence presented by the EPPO to be admitted in court even if national laws provide different rules for the collection and presentation of evidence. I would be happy to assist the committee with any queries it may have on the matter while bearing in mind the statutory strictures on expressing opinions on the merits of Government policy.