Mr. Roland Freudenstein:

I do not have anecdotal evidence. However, I have observed how the Commissioners' cabinets operate and the amount of work they are obliged to devote to what they call "covering" the cabinets of the other Commissioners is growing exponentially. We are now at a point where the machine starts creating its own work and the energy that is necessary to keep it going. In terms of portfolios of actual policy fields to be addressed by the European Commission, it is completely nonsensical to have more than 20. Even 15 would probably be a high number. We do not need that many Commissioners. The Romanians and the Bulgarians joined the EU but having a Commissioner for Multilingualism is a bit of a joke. To be honest, this provides grist to the mill of the populists. If we consider the cost that is involved with having a Commissioner, a director general and so on, it really makes no sense. However, I understand that point that every country needs its representative in Brussels. I have no perfect solution for that conundrum. I am merely pointing it out. I see the reason for there being 27 - soon to be 28 - Commissioners but I do not think this is sustainable if we want to reach a more efficient and democratically legitimate system of European institutions.

On the different speeds, there are some member states - the capital of one of which is Paris - which have been dreaming about a two-tier Union for a long time, essentially since the mid-1990s. Having a core Europe was very much a French idea. It was, to a degree, the French reaction to the eastern enlargement of the European Union. The latter made France uncomfortable for a couple of reasons, many of which have to do with its eastern neighbour, Germany. To have a core Union would be to re-establish a system in which France could continue to play its role. Now that the Franco-German couple has actually transformed into something new - I am being careful and I am not saying it is over because the basis is very solid on a civil society level - and does not work as it used to work, all the front lines in the old European discourse are changing as well. The German ideal is that if it is necessary to have a two-tier Europe, then it will probably be the eurozone and the rest - that is, the EU 17 versus the EU 10, which will soon be 11 with the accession of Croatia. However, the core must be open to whomever wants and is able to join. That is a precondition. One does not hear that half sentence in Paris very much these days. The ideal is to have a much more permanent structure with a core and a loose periphery, which may, of course, contain Britain in some role.

Why is Germany insisting on having a two-tier system only temporarily and with as few institutional differences as possible? To put it very simply, Germany feels exactly the opposite to France. Many of its natural allies in the context of the philosophical approach to economics, solid finances, transatlantic relations, etc., are in the EU 10 rather than the EU 17. Germany is very much of the view that its natural allies are out there, which is why they should not be distanced from the core too much. There are national factors at play in this regard. In Brussels, in the EPP and in general among those who consider themselves federalist, a two-speed Europe that would be in place for a period is considered inevitable. Again, this will probably coagulate around the eurozone for the moment. Optimally, it would be temporary and as many countries as possible would be in the core. Perhaps one day there could be a situation where everyone would be on board again.

Deputy Kyne inquired about a referendum. Every member state has its mechanisms of ratification. Some member states such as Germany do not even hold referenda. Ireland's position on grand treaty change is very careful and cautious. Such change would be a precondition for most of what I have outlined in my paper. That change would begin after the next European election and would probably commence with an intergovernmental conference in 2015. It will have to be put to a referendum. One can discuss whether all member states will be obliged to agree or whether a minimum threshold of, for example, 20 member states should be fixed. There are those who state that in the context of treaty change, a clause should be inserted to the effect that any change must be approved by at least 20 member states in order that it might enter into force. There would be a de facto opt out for some countries but with corresponding consequences.

In the context of the direct election of the presidents of the Commission or the Council, we are all aware that this would only be possible through treaty change. As I described and according to the Lisbon treaty, the current procedure is that the European Council makes a proposal based on the results of the European elections and then the European Parliament elects - de facto, it rubber stamps the proposal. Of course the Parliament can state beforehand that it is going to reject the person put forward and if this is deemed a credible threat, then the Council will probably put forward a different proposal. It will be very interesting to observe the next election. What I was proposing in the short-term - this would be possible without treaty change - would be an indirect election of the President by having top candidates for the campaigns of the big political families in the European Parliament elections. This election would involve those families saying, "If you vote for us, you will get that person for Commission President". This is already a big step towards more democratic legitimacy which would fall below the threshold of a treaty change that would, as I pointed out, unleash a series of problems.

The next matter that arises in this regard relates to what will be the divisions. Will they be north, south, east, west, large, small or whatever? The answer is that they will all come into play.

It is in a way an open process and it will be interesting to see what effect the sheer existence of top candidates for the political families will have. Will it reverse or at least halt the decrease in turnout? Will it contribute to a sense of European demos, an all-European constituency? Will it lead to those divisions that the Chairman pointed out? One could imagine saying that even the candidates will probably have to come from larger member states. Even if they come from one large member state, will they be acceptable in a different one? If the President were to come from a smaller state that might be an advantage because it would be more acceptable to all the big member states. It is a totally open question but we will all learn about the European Union, its future and what it will mean for ourselves in this run-up to the elections in May 2014.

Regarding the European Central Bank, there is a basic difference between a more Germany-centred philosophy of a totally independent European Central Bank and a more French-centred philosophy of making the ECB much more politically accountable to the powers that be, whether they be the national governments, the European institutions or a European government in the future. That is an open question and the role it could play to further economic convergence is contained within that question. I do not see the role of the ECB changing very much in any new set-up that I have described. For example, Germany would be extremely hesitant to change anything regardless of what other treaty changes we may have.