Mr. Roland Freudenstein:

The Bundesrat consists of members of the Länder governments, not members of the legislatures. I am not aware of any national example - although there may be such a case - in which members of regional legislatures make up the second chamber of a bicameral national parliamentary system. That is what is proposed under this particular model.

It must be acknowledged that there is a trade-off between substantially increased involvement by national legislatures and the efficiency and speed of European legislation. If the slowness, inertia and complexity of decision-making at European level is already contributing to populist views on European institutions, the question then is whether a more substantial formal role for national parliaments on top of what we already have will see any improvement in that regard. That must be a huge factor in any decision. In seeking to provide enhanced legitimacy there is a danger that we will de facto reduce it in another respect by making the whole process more complicated. We already have the European semester process whereby national parliaments look onto each other's plates as far as budgetary policies are concerned. The extent to which that will evolve into real veto rights of one parliament over another is a question that remains to be answered. We already have a situation in which national parliaments can tell their colleagues in another country that this or that is not in accordance with the agreed policy principles of the European Union. We do not, however, have 100% watertight sanction mechanisms in place in case of violations.

On the politicisation of the Commission, I agree that the neutrality, in a party political sense, of the Commission is one of the cornerstones of the Rome treaties and indeed the whole system. I am saying that if we go the way the federalists in Brussels want to go, it will be the most fundamental reform of the system of European integration we have ever seen. If the Commission is to achieve greater legitimacy and to be seen by citizens as the executive which emanates from their own political choice in the ballot box, then we need to give political parties more of a role in the Commission. That goes against the grain of the Rome treaties and probably against the grain of what we now see as the Community method. It is unavoidable, however, if we want to go down that road. The alternative is to accept that we will not achieve the best possible degree of democratic legitimacy. In the context of the grand coalition mentality in the European Parliament to which I referred, as soon as we have political parties dominating the Commission in an open manner we will get not only more winners but also more losers. Parts of the constituency will inevitably feel excluded as a result of a particular democratic decision, the victory of majority over minority. For these reasons, we must think any changes through very carefully. If we want to increase democratic legitimacy, we must accept there will be side effects such as the one I have outlined. This is especially true for small countries. Many of the federalist proposals since the 1990s, for example, envisage a reduction in the number of Commissioners. Promises have been made in this regard.

When we turn the next corner with the next treaty reform, we will - regardless of the number of member states - finally reduce or at least freeze the number of Commissioners. We have never previously managed that and I can understand why. Small countries are of the view that if the Commission is something akin to an executive in Brussels, then they want to be represented on it. They want this even if the individual involved is legally committed to representing the Union's interests. They want a de factopresence.