Mr. Matthew Elderfield:

A lot of progress has been made to improve supervision, the rule book, the powers and taking enforcement actions against firms. Action against individuals is the missing link and we all have put our fingers on that link.

I have got some ideas. I want to be very clear about where the weaknesses are. Like I say, the committee would need somebody to work through it more systematically than I have done. One of the questions is about the role of different enforcement bodies. We have the Garda Bureau of Fraud Investigation, the Office of the Director of Corporate Enforcement and my office. The UK has the Serious Fraud Office and the Americans have the FBI. We must ask ourselves what resourcing levels could we expect and the capabilities in terms of those areas. We have really geared up our enforcement area which now consists of between 50 an 60 people. Has everybody got the right skill-set? That is one set of questions. I know that we have done a lot of work on that, on ourselves, but I do not know about elsewhere. I am not criticising the Garda bureau or the ODCE. The following is an open question that the committee could ask. Do they have the capacity to do the number of cases that the public and the representatives of the public want? That is my first question.

There are some outstanding recommendations. The Director of Corporate Enforcement recommended improving the legislative framework and the ability to pursue cases. For example, he talked about the questioning of suspects and the rules for same. The Department of Justice and Equality has produced a White Paper on white collar crime. Where does the paper stand? What future action will be taken?

As I mentioned, a number of legal offences could be tightened up. If we take administrative sanction against a firm, then we will want to establish that the individuals are culpable as well. We have a test of responsibility for individuals which is quite a tough hurdle to get through. Is that calibrated the right way in order to take an action against an individual as well as against a firm? That needs some thought.

Like I say, in the UK there is a concept of presumptive liability. If one is a director of a bank that has failed, rather than the regulator having to establish that he or she is liable and whether he or she should be disqualified, there should be a presumption of disqualification. That matter should be examined. There are some pros and cons. Will it discourage people going into the system? Will it keep people on their toes? The committee should debate the matter. These are things it should examine.

The Vice Chairman asked if there was a reckless trading in financial services concept. The committee can take action on that.

The committee needs to conduct a very systematic trawl. There are certain constitutional protections for individuals in terms of a right to earn a living. How does that interact with action on fitness and probity? We really need a public debate. Perhaps an inquiry would be a good way. I had not thought about an inquiry as a way into it but instead thought of a wise person, a Green Paper or something like that. We must think about it systematically. There are pros and cons and the committee must do a thorough job. We must be very open about the fact that an inquiry will not help current cases. Is it not the case that all of the current cases are under existing laws?

There has been talk of lessons learned from the crisis and improved regulation. First, I shall consider the lessons learned. Who has done the stock-take in this area? We have had the Honohan report, the Comptroller and Auditor General's report, the Nyberg report, the Regling-Watson report and I am sure that I have not identified many other reports.