Dr. Rhona Mahony:

I note Deputy Maloney's comments. It is quite extraordinary that in Ireland the 1861 Act stands and we have not legislated for the X case, yet we have gone to great lengths, as I said earlier, to avoid addressing the reality of maternal death during pregnancy. Therefore, women are allowed to travel from this jurisdiction despite the fact that termination of pregnancy remains a criminal offence in Ireland. That is, of course, extraordinary.

Deputy Healy asked number of questions, some of which might best be addressed to the lawyers. When we talk about legal clarity and whether I am happy that the provisions in the Bill give us what we are looking for, there is provision to remove the 1861 legislation, which I favour. There is provision in the Bill to have doctors protected by the law in making their opinions, and where they perceive there is a substantial risk to life I believe, under this Bill, they will be protected in that regard, which is very important.

On whether there is adequate access, there are number of issues. In terms of emergencies, all of the 19 units in this country have comprehensive cover. For example, in the case of haemorrhage or fulminating blood pressure, all units in Ireland are capable of carrying out those procedures. If they are not, they should not be open for business, because if one is running an obstetric institution one must be able to take on obstetric emergencies.

In terms of access for more complicated medical disorders, as I said, we have a great network. We cannot have every single medical discipline in every single hospital. We do network for expert opinion and can pick up the phone and talk to each other. We all know each other quite well. We are used to working together. We have a culture of working together and of seeking other opinions.

On the specific area of access - namely, the question of seven days to make a submission and seven days for appeal - I agree with Dr. Boylan. We have to be very careful. There is a medical problem at stake and how imminent the risk of death is will determine the procedure.

Compared with many other specialties, obstetricians are well used to dealing with emergencies. In fact, a great deal of our business is emergency and unplanned in nature. If ever there was a specialty suited to delivering in this role, it is us.

An interesting question was posed in regard to midwives. If there is a liability, it lies with doctors who are the ones who assess the women and make the judgment. Such is the case in many instances in medicine. Where I make a decision to do an operation, I am responsible and accountable. That is how I practise.

The Supreme Court judgment is truly an interesting one. I will begin by saying, as I have many times, that I do not distinguish between physical and mental risk to life. We are talking about whether a woman will die. If she commits suicide, she is dead, in the same way that a woman might die from pre-eclampsia, haemorrhage or whatever else. I do not make that distinction. I am not a lawyer, but what is central to the whole judgment is the interpretation of Article 40.3.3°. Clearly, prior to any prospect of a baby surviving, because of prematurity, it cannot be about a balance of rights. That does not make sense. It can only be about the substantial risk to the life of the mother because if she dies, her baby dies too. That is central to and the core of this whole issue. We must seek to prevent two unnecessary deaths and save women's lives. We cannot simply balance rights at 15 weeks gestation because then one will find against termination of pregnancy and I am afraid some women will die.