Mr. John Moran:

The first thing to remember – this is commonly misunderstood – is that there are differences between the relationship of the Department's shareholder management unit, SMU, and the banks and that of the regulator and the banks. The regulator has a relationship as regulator of the banks and, therefore, has much greater access to information in respect of the underlying operations of the banks. Our role is effectively as shareholder in the banks. The particular relationship with the banks is set out in a relationship framework which we put in place at the beginning of last year – in March, I believe. The frameworks, which are publicly available on our website, set out the negotiated position with the troika. The troika had views on this, as did the Department and bank management. We set out a level of engagement for involvement in the operation of the banks. In the case of remuneration, we have a different level of engagement than in respect of individual lending decisions, for example. The arrangements are designed to insulate the banks, which should be commercial operations, from any individual interference in respect of loans. If there are circumstances where people want to know what is happening in respect of a particular loan, it is not a role in which the Department should have a part. Our primary function as a shareholder is in respect of the appointment of the board. The board and management of the banks should, therefore, run the banks. What happens is that we have management meetings. I believe I outlined this at some stage, perhaps at a meeting of the Joint Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform. We meet the banks on a formal basis, a monthly basis. They lay out the performance that they-----