Captain Paul Cullen:

The reason we are here this morning is to explain that a tired pilot is a dangerous pilot. I will give a brief explanation of fatigue and why it is a problem. As pilots we work in a 24-hour business, around the clock. We work irregular schedules involving night-time work, early starts, late finishes and time zone changes. Some of our duties are quite mentally demanding. Flight time limitations dictate how a pilot's roster is structured, defining the duty limits for a day, a week, a month, a year. The ICAO, the United Nations agency concerned with civil aviation, has stated that the sole purpose of flight time limitations, FTL, is to limit the working hours of pilots in order to minimise the threat of pilot fatigue.

Fatigue is a physiological state of reduced mental or physical performance capability. It impairs a crew member's alertness and ability to operate an aircraft safely or to perform safety related duties. It is caused by sleep loss or extended time awake, circadian rhythm disturbances - one's body clock - or mental or physical workload.

Much is known about the relationship between pilot fatigue and accidents. From 1991 to 2005, nearly half of all aircraft accidents had pilot error or cockpit crew as a contributory factor. The scientific consensus is that a large proportion of these accidents were related to pilot fatigue. The US National Transportation and Safety Board has stated that 20% to 30% of all transport accidents have fatigue as a contributory factor. Up to 20% of all aviation accidents have fatigue as a contributory factor.

The first case where fatigue was diagnosed in a fatal accident was in 1993.

Since then there have been many accidents where fatigue has been shown to have played a role. In 2009, in a major air accident in the United States - if the members are not familiar with it they should Google "Colgan Air" and it will come up - an aircraft operating a flight from Newark to Buffalo crashed resulting in 50 people losing their lives. The crew is shown on the slide. In the subsequent inquiry it was found that one of the pilots, who lived on the other side of America, had commuted across the United States the night before and spent the night sleeping in a crew lounge. They discovered that this was not uncommon. Pictured is the wreckage of the aircraft, which crashed on top of someone's house.

We fear that Europe might be closer to that scenario than we think. We believe that because of the results of some recent studies. A Scandinavian study of pilots revealed that 80% had made fatigue related errors, 40% had been involved in incidents where they felt that fatigue was a factor, and 50% had fallen asleep in the cockpit without warning their colleague.

Pilots must undergo regular medical check-ups at least once a year by what is known as aeromedical examiners. In the United Kingdom, 70% of these aeromedical examiners believe that fatigue is on the increase, 75% of the doctors believe that one quarter of UK pilots are too tired to fly safely, and 60% believe that the pilots are falling asleep in flight. A recent study of a UK airline revealed that 45% of the pilots were severely fatigued. What is most alarming about those UK figures is that UK pilots do not operate under the same scheme as those in the rest of Europe. They operate under more stringent rules called CAP 371.

That brings me to the European Aviation Safety Authority, EASA, proposal. EASA's proposal came about because it was required under international and European law. EASA commissioned what is known as the Moebus report which was compiled by ten independent scientists who were chosen by EASA. Those scientists concluded that the current flight time limitations are deficient. They came up with 33 recommendations and then EASA came up with a proposal which complied with only two of the 33 recommendations. As expected, there was uproar, and as a reaction, EASA appointed three independent scientists to review its proposal. The three independent scientists worked independently of each other. They used different methodologies, however, but came up with similar findings. Their findings not only supported the Moebus findings but contradicted EASA's proposal. EASA's proposal is required, under international law, to be based on science. However, we believe it is not.

For an airline to survive, productivity always must be balanced with protection, but in this case we believe that the balance is tipped in favour of protection and, economically, we do not agree that this is required. For example, in 2011, ten European airlines made a profit. Of those ten airlines, two are Irish. The two big Irish airlines made a profit.

We have three main areas of concern with the proposal, namely, night duties, stand-by duties and disrupted schedules. I will start with night duties. EASA has defined a night duty as any duty that encroaches on the period 02.00 to 04.59. EASA's own scientists have recommended that such duties should be restricted to ten hours, and EASA claims it has proposed 11 hours. However, the devil is in the detail. If one looks at the proposal, by EASA's own definition a duty could start at 3 o'clock in the afternoon and end at 3 a.m. That is 12 hours, not 11 as stated by EASA, and twice a week a pilot could start a duty at 1 p.m. and finish it at 3 a.m. That is 14 hours, which is 40% more than what the scientists claim is safe and three hours more than what EASA is claiming it proposed.

How do we make this safer? We propose that night duties should be limited to ten hours as a basic rule, with no extensions. We request that specific research on night operations is started now. If the airlines want to operate longer than ten hours they should wait until scientific research is done that says it is safe and if it says it is safe, we will agree to it. Until then, we should stay on the safe side.

Our second issue is stand-by duties. There is science that states that these duties, as proposed by EASA, are unsafe. However, I would ask that for now common sense be used. If today is day 4 and I go to bed tonight at 9.30 having worked early duties all week - tomorrow will be my fifth day on duty - sleep for eight hours and because I am scheduled to get up early I could be expected to wake up at 5.30 a.m. My stand-by duty would start at 5.30 a.m. I could spend almost eight hours at home on stand-by and not a minute of that time will count towards my duty. My telephone could ring at 12.25 in the afternoon instructing me that I am required to start a duty in the airport at 1.25 p.m. I could legally then operate a 14 hour duty which would have me finishing at 3.25 a.m. That is 22 hours after the start of my duty and possibly 22 hours after I have woken up. If I am being honest, it is unlikely that I would fall asleep at the controls when I am about to land an aircraft. Thanks to coffee and adrenaline the chances are I would stay awake. However, if I have been awake for 22 hours my co-ordination and judgment will be affected and, God forbid, if something goes wrong in those final few moments of the flight I will not be able to react as quickly as I would if I was a fully rested pilot.

Science has shown that there is a direct relationship between tiredness and performance degradation as there is between alcohol intoxication and performance degradation. Science has also shown that if any of us in this room is awake for 22 hours, our performance will be degraded to the same extent as if we have had four pints of lager.

I am sure in their jobs all the members have done a good deal of travelling throughout the country. Thankfully, in a car they have a hand-brake; they can pull over and stop. There are also rumble strips on the side of the motorway which will indicate that they are starting to sway. We do not have that on an airplane. We do not have a hand-brake we can pull in the air, nor do we have rumble strips.

How do we make this safe? We propose that a cap be put on the combination of stand-by and flight duty period. We propose 16 hours. Sixteen hours has been proposed and accepted in the United States, and EASA has also referred to a cap of 16 hours total duty if a pilot is on stand-by at the airport.

The third issue that concerns us is disruptive schedules. Disruptive schedules disturb the body clock, and that introduces fatigue. I refer to duties that start early in the morning, finish late at night or run through the night. EASA scientists have recommended that after more than three of those disruptive type duties there should be an extended rest period of three full nights. That is not three days off; it is three days during which the pilot is getting a full night's sleep. The EASA scientists have also proposed that early starts are stabilised, which means that as the days go on, the pilot cannot be expected to get up earlier each day. The start times have to be similar. That is what EASA scientists have said, and they have also defined an early start as a duty that starts between 05.00 and 06.59. However, the EASA proposal has ignored the scientific advice. It has proposed that up to seven of these duties should be allowed and rather than having three nights rest, the pilot needs only two nights rest. It has also disregarded the recommendation of the unstable early starts.

As recently as last autumn, due to pressure from the airlines, EASA has also introduced an opt-out mechanism where a country can opt out of these rules by declaring itself as an early type country. That window of 05.00 to 06.59 is now reduced to 05.00 to 05.59. That is purely due to airline pressure. That was not in the initial proposal EASA put out in January 2012. How do we make that safer? We must replace the early-late definition with a single definition as recommended by EASA scientists. As a compromise we propose three local nights, with an extended recovery rest, and four or more consecutive early-late duties.

It is not all bad news, however. We welcome some of what EASA has done including, first, on home base and, second, on the limits of 1,000 hours in a year and 100 hours in a 28 day period. Home base has been defined as the location where a crew member normally starts and ends his or her duties. EASA's latest proposal specifies the principle of permanence and that the travel time between bases should count as duty. We welcome that because this is an exclusive issue to Ireland where currently it is abused.

On the issue of the 1,000 hours and the 100 hours, I would point out that 1,000 hours and 100 hours relates only to flight time; it is not duty time.

It is equal to the time a Member spends standing in the Dáil, a solicitor spends standing in court or a doctor spends in theatre. As members will be aware, there are many more duties involved.

It has also proposed a limit of 1,000 hours in any period of 12 consecutive months, which we welcome. The current practice in Ireland is for pilots to work 900 hours in a calendar year but also to work 100 hours in a 28 day period, which could have them working up to 1,800 hours in a period of 18 months. When the Irish Aviation Authority presented to the committee last October, it pointed out that 1,000 hours worked out at 19.23 hours per week. That is 19.23 hours of flying time, not doing other duties.

Pilots do not work hard consistently all year around. Most aeroplanes spend considerable time being serviced in the summer, when pilots take most of their annual leave. However, during busy times pilots frequently work 100 hours every 28 days. I spoke about the additional time we work. Typically, a pilot will be working 45 minutes before a flight departs. A pilot can have four flights in a day and there will be duties to perform after the last flight. This can amount to two and a half hours every day a pilot goes to work, which is not included in the figure of 19.23 hours of flying time.

Typically a pilot will work a fixed pattern roster, with five days on and three days off. This means the pilot is not available to work 28 days but 16. This means we work 100 hours in 16 days. If we work 100 hours in 16 days, plus the two and a half hours, it works out at eight hours 45 minutes a day, which is 43 hours and 45 minutes per week, which is much greater than 19.23 hours.

Not every pilot works five days on and three days off. There are occasions when a pilot might work five days on and four or five days off. Then the numbers are even greater, with pilots working up to 50 hours. Pilots are typically working between 45 and 50 hours a week.