Professor William Binchy:

I will take the last point about fatal abnormalities first. I think the view was expressed this morning that existing Irish law would be interpreted as providing for abortion in those circumstances. The short answer I would give is that I do not agree that is how the law would be interpreted. Nothing is certain in this world but that is my view. I take the point about the D case, but my view is that a speculative argument was made which succeeded in that case but that the law would not be so interpreted in Ireland.

I pick up on what Deputy Ó Caoláin said a second time, and it is a fair point. I thought I had answered the first time but perhaps I did not answer the question clearly enough. It is said, "Well, are we not locked into the X decision here and, therefore, there is no problem in terms of a rolling development of the law into further areas". The answer I gave, and which I would give again, is that the change of culture involved in transforming Irish medical practice to allow for the provision of abortion, for the actuality of abortion, for no requirement of due care to the child and for the requirement that suicidal ideation would be a ground for abortion, would have an effect. Let us not exaggerate these things. Not tomorrow or the next day but over a period of time that would have an effect on medical practice in this area such that the attitude towards abortion would be transformed. It is reasonable to project that the net effect would be that the actual interpretations of the grounds would change over time.

We have experience not only in England, although the experience in England is striking on this point, but in many countries that when a change is made in the law, for the best of reasons, to allow for the intentional destruction of the life of the unborn child, a cultural change is made and it is very difficult to stop. We heard of the tragic example mentioned by Deputy Catherine Byrne of a young girl who may have been raped or subject to sexual abuse. Should we not have an abortion in those circumstances? I believe Deputy Byrne was saying it would be appropriate to do so. Already, we would be discussing these matters and extensions for these hard cases. It would be very difficult to have a principled basis for opposing them. That is the point I am making about the cultural change in this area. This is a human rights question. Sometimes human rights are difficult and the actual experience of protecting human rights is difficult.

The final point links into that very difficulty. If, as legislators and society, we are going to say unborn children are to be protected, making absolutely sure the lives of mothers during pregnancy are equally protected and that no mother dies, there is a solemn, real and tangible economic and social obligation on our society to provide the support for women who find themselves in crisis pregnancies, not just lip service but actual social and economic support. That is a practical question and not one, perhaps, to be addressed in detail today, but when we talk about changes in the law that is an area where legislators can introduce changes to provide the social and economic support for women who find pregnancy a challenge.

On the human rights issue, let us not change our culture whereby we recognise that to be a human being, at all stages from the very beginning to the very end of life, is to be part of an important, crucial, valuable enterprise, the human experience of life. Our culture is built on the notion that every person has equal dignity and entitlement to equal respect and equal rights. Let us not throw away that very important principle, for the best of reasons and motivations, but rather do what I mentioned in my first remarks to the committee and look down the road 500 yards, see what they are doing in those hospitals and give legal protection to that. Do not change the law so as to bring in an abortion regime.