Mr. Maurice Mullen:

The final report was presented by Fisher Associates as what they regarded as the full position. It is the document that is on the table today. The consultants recognised that different stakeholders presented different views and agendas and they looked carefully into each of the issues raised. Much of the difference between the two documents is accounted for when one considers the iterative process that was followed. In the initial stages many of the stakeholders expressed negative views. Fisher Associates realised, however, that some had a far from even moderate understanding of the different relationships that must exist between a regulatory service, in this case the Marine Survey Office and the Coast Guard, and other stakeholders in a service. There are certain walls that must be maintained but which were crossed over in many instances, causing them to draw conclusions which were not appropriate. All I can say is that Fisher Associates took the opportunity to examine all of these different issues and ultimately to come to their informed conclusion.

The options were expanded by the consultants to include their perspective on what they were told. We ourselves are widening that process further, simply because there is no simple answer to all of these issues. We recognise that there are difficulties in finding ways of moving forward. As such, we have engaged to look at different ways of working and we have not yet decided what the options will be. Our position is indicative of the complexity of finding a solution within very limited resources while at the same time seeking to capture issues that are important and give weight to them, such as local expertise and so on. That is why this process is still under play and why, rather than options being written off, more options have, in fact, come onto the table.

I regret the use of terms like "lie after lie" in our discussion today. In the case of the reference to "catastrophic failure" in regard to events in 2008, there has been an attempt to convey that this somehow misrepresented the whole game. In fact, all that is required for clarity is a simple understanding as to why certain actions were taken in 2008, when there was the potential for a catastrophic failure on equipment in Dublin. There is no question about that and, as I indicated earlier, we had to renew the Dublin equipment immediately. However, this upgrading at Dublin meant that two previously unavailable equipment spares were now available, which meant we could then continue operating Malin and Valentia with greater safety. Action was taken purely to deal with an imminent danger. We were already stretched using old equipment in three centres. As soon as we fitted out Dublin with the new equipment, we had working spares that could be used in the event of anything untoward happening in Malin or Valentia while they were awaiting upgrade.