Results 12,801-12,820 of 36,274 for speaker:Pearse Doherty
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Yes, and the question is: I know that it was an accounting standard but did the board fully understand the implications of the adoption of IAS 39 standard had on the financial statements of the bank?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Well to the extent that expected losses may not be recognised in the end of year accounts because of IAS 39 and that it could provide a comfort maybe for the board. Did they, did they ... was this explained, did they understand IAS 39?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. To the extent that you or any other board members had concerns with the adoption of IAS 39, was any concerns raised with the regulator? Was there any concerns, did you have concerns with IAS 39 or any other board member that you know of and was it ... was those concerns, if they existed, raised with the regulator or the Central Bank?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. Do you feel that the amount provided for in the provision for bad debts was adequate and in hindsight do you feel that the amount provided should have been different?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: No, in the ... yes, well yes. Well under ... in your report, in ... the provisions that the bank made for bad debts.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. Mr. Went, finally can I ask you what role, if any, did you play in your institution in bringing it to a point where it needed to be rescued for the State, less than 18 months after you left your position? What decisions did you make that helped bring that about or do you completely absolve yourself from any decisions or directions that the bank took at your time that set it on this course?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Go raibh maith agat. Fáilte roimh tUasal Gantly. Can I ask you, and it was mentioned in relation to the e-mail to IFSRA on 22 November, it's on page 11-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Yes, it's Vol. 2. On 22 November, Peter Fitzpatrick stated, "To quote Schroders in the UK, who met with [Bank of Ireland] yesterday, the CEO said that "in quarter one the issue for all Irish banks was one of survival"." Can you expand on this comment that's made in this e-mail, that as early as to November 2007 they're suggesting that the Irish banks' survival is the key issue for the next...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Do you share the view that, at that point, there was an issue in terms of the Irish banks' survival?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: That it was that serious or it was getting that serious?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: The e-mail also talks about the fall in stock prices and at the end there, the second last paragraph, the two lines, says, "Another reason for the stock prices going off is another round of margin calls in the remaining [contract for difference] market. I am told that this is all done and dusted now and that a good number of previously wealthy folk have lost their shirts in [contract for...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: We've heard about this short-selling and, you know, and it's in this e-mail as well. And we had the Government instigating ... or in ... the Central Bank instigating an inquiry in relation to Anglo. But isn't it not the case that the actual short-selling of stocks and the banks that they were short-selling - if they were short-selling - if they were spreading the rumours then to benefit...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Short-selling is a normal practice, although it was banned, but it was a normal practice and a legitimate practice. The issue here, and it is referred in the e-mail, is that people would have been involved in short-selling and would spread what would be viewed by some as malicious rumours in relation to events.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Short, yes.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. In terms of the pre-crash period, when did you begin to notice that something was up with the capital markets?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Yes.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: And what was the perception of Irish financial institutions during that period, 2007 going up to 2008? What were they saying to you? Like, you were on the end of the phone to them, you were meeting with them, they were telling you what they thought of the banks, what they thought of your bank.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Well, the markets, the funds.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)
Pearse Doherty: But the lenders to your institution, what were they saying? What was the perception of the markets in relation to Irish financial institutions?