Results 12,761-12,780 of 36,274 for speaker:Pearse Doherty

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Yes.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: In your note with ... on your conversation with Brian Patterson at the Irish Times Trust board meeting-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: The Irish Times board meeting, sorry, yes.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: You say that the regulator had no legal powers to prohibit particular products; they do have general prudential powers, including the threat to impose ... including the threat of the imposition of incremental capital. You go on to say what IFSRA need to do was to have the courage of their convictions on any particular issue. What do you mean by that?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: No, the powers are ... the courage of their convictions - what do you mean by that?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Did you have the courage of your own convictions when it came to your own bank and deciding whether to introduce 100% loan-to-value mortgages?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: But even though you were fit to be tied, even though you thought this policy was a disaster, even though that this policy provided no risk to the customers and so on and so forth - even though you lectured the Financial Regulator with not having courage of their convictions - you went ahead and stuck your hand in the fire because First Active were ... had their hand in the fire.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: But other banks ... did all ... did ... other banks decided not to do this. Some institutions decided not to do this.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: But has ... is there an institution that didn't?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Okay. Did Nationwide introduce a 100%-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: In 2005.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Okay.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Okay.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: I get that, okay.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Okay. Do you regret the decision of not sticking to your convictions in relation to the 100% LTVs?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Yes, okay. That's ... you've made that point very clear and thorough. What is your view on the facilities offered to borrowers such as interest-only repayment loans and increased loan-to-values ratios and what effect these had ... these facilities had on the property market at the time?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: The question I'm really having is ... not that ... you know, we know right across-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: -----all the institutions there was a very low level of arrears.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: There was high employment and so on. The question is: what impact did it have on the property market? Do you accept now today with hindsight, for example 100% loan-to-value ratios and interest-only loans ... did you, do you believe that they helped create a property bubble which allowed prices to spiral - some would say - out of control?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Are you aware of any loans or terms offered to borrowers, which would be considered outside the normal commercial terms available at your institution, made during the period of your tenure and, if so, can you clarify the reasons why this happened?