Results 12,721-12,740 of 36,274 for speaker:Pearse Doherty

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Yes.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Could I just ask this because you sat on the board? So one of the findings was, in Deloitte, that Mr. Fingleton was the individual who extended Stg£10 million of a loan on his own say, nobody else, and this was also backed up in terms of the independent internal review.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: When those findings were made, did the board investigate these findings and clarify whether that was the case or not, or did you just say, "That was a nice read and let’s move on to the next item on the agenda"?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: What explanation did you receive?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Fáilte to Mr. McGann chuig an coiste. Can I ask you just to start off with: in your opinion was the decision to combine the role of finance director and the chief risk officer prudent or appropriate at the time when the loans were growing rapidly, in terms of the need to maintain an independent risk function at the time, allocation needed ... and the time allocation needed for both...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Okay, it wasn't prudent or appropriate, in hindsight. And, when this was discussed, was it discussed in detail? Was there ... this is quite an important change, a big change, was there discussions or was it just a rubber-stamping situation by the board?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Who proposed it?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Mr. Walsh, on page 2 of your statement, you say the unique combination of the freeze in liquidity and interbank lending, coupled with the huge deposit withdrawals, was not anticipated; its scale and reach impacted globally across the wide range of industry and commerce and not just banking. Now, one could argue that this is one view of the international context. Evidence presented to this...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: So when agencies and those who advise investors were saying "sell, sell your shares in Anglo Irish Bank" as early as January 2008 because of the exposure, overexposure to commercial property and then seeing what was happening in the market and what was likely to happen in the future, how did the board respond to that?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: But you were being downgraded in early 2008-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: -----as a result of overexposure in property. We had the Financial Timesarticle, for example, in around the "St. Patrick's Day massacre", talking about Anglo Irish Bank being in the same boat as some of the other banks that had gone bust and run into trouble. So this wasn't a secret kind of conversation that was happening between the numbers. There was openly people ... large institutions...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: What strategies did the board put forward to address the downgrades that were happening at that time, in early 2008?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Mr. McGann, we have seen evidence at this committee and ... you know, in terms of where all the banks seen themselves post-2008. It was a presentation, I think, either to the Central Bank or to the Department, and Anglo Irish Bank stood out because they expected to lend more during that period. They believed they were going to be highly profitable and so on and so forth. We have heard...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Do you regret not recognising at that point in time that the model may have been broke?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: In relation to the St. Patrick's Day massacre, can you inform the committee as to whether this was discussed at board meetings and what were the issues raised by the drop of Anglo's share price?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Would you accept that while the St. Patrick's Day massacre was the most dramatic fall in share prices, that your bank was taking a bludgeoning for the previous number of months, right back as far back as 2007 in terms of share drops?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Okay. Can I go back to the point you mentioned in terms of the, the Druids Glen outing? And you said that the meeting took place in Fintan Drury's house. Is that house in Druids Glen?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: No? Where was that meeting?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: No, well, you see, it's important because we have not been told that ... up until now, and the public hasn't been told that there was a private meeting in a residence, despite this being a matter of public discussion since 2011 at least. There has been never a suggestion that there was a meeting in a private house off Druids Glen.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (3 Sep 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Okay. The agenda for the meeting ... can you furnish the agenda to the meeting to the committee?