Results 12,541-12,560 of 36,274 for speaker:Pearse Doherty
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: So, and, correct me just where I'm wrong.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: You organised the event. Brian Cowen was going, and understood he was going, to have a round of golf - how many holes is still questionable - with yourself and Seánie FitzPatrick. You decided to have a private meeting with five individuals, then go for a round of golf, which takes, if it's nine holes, about two hours, and then continue the meeting afterwards, at a later stage over,...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: And did you ... did you inform Mr. Cowen that Seánie FitzPatrick would be the participant on the golf course, and ... on that, before the event?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: And, and the last question is this, is it in relation to following up just from Senator O'Keeffe's ... the former Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern, gave evidence to this inquiry in relation to the former Taoiseach, Brian Cowen, coming from the airport, directly to his house. He gave evidence saying that he was concerned in relation to what was happening in Anglo, that they discussed it, and both of...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: -----tangential or, or something of, of that nature. Was ... is that the case?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Go raibh maith agat, a Chathaoirligh, agus fáilte roimh an beirt agaibh. I'm gonna, Mr. Aynsley, just focus in on ... just that statement that you give on page 15 ... the shock that you referred to in your statement in January 2013 when you received the e-mail memorandum from one of your direct reports. You go on to say about the Department of Finance official was opposed to the sale of...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay, and in relation to ... that's the first transaction-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay, I appreciate that.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. The first transaction that's referred to in your statement was completed and opposed by the Department. The second transaction wasn't and they were, as was said ... was requesting that it would be sold at €100 less than what ... €100 million, not €100 ... they'd maybe settle for that one ... a €100 million less to another party.
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: So, the second transaction is a hypothetical transaction. Is that what it is?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: No, it's not a hypothetical transaction. Okay. But the figure is a hypothetical figure. Would that be correct?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay and what impact did that have in relation to the bank as to how they then progressed from there?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay, can I move on to another-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: You go on to talk about your astonishment at ... another key point was the bilateral sales arrangement that the Department of Finance wanted you to engage on, something that you had previously embargoed in favour of open sales that were transparent, arm's-length and fully valued. Can you inform the committee again, without any details or any specific case, did such bilateral sale...
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay, so if it were-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. So if there were, as you've said ... you did engage in bilateral sale arrangements, then why are you so astonished at the fact that the Department of Finance was asking you to enter into bilateral sales agreements and how do you say that the bank had embargoed them, given what you're just after telling us?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: And was the Department of Finance wanting you to do that at a massive level?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: Okay. You talk on page 8 of your statement about the sale in July 2011 of a large part of Anglo's US portfolio-----
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: -----a sale that you describe as, quote, "sub-optimal" in terms of recovery levels and one that would not have been undertaken by the bank, and to quote you again "without ministerial instruction". Mr. Aynsley, are you saying, or not, in your statement, that the sub-optimal sale of Anglo's US assets in July 2011 was done under ministerial instruction?
- Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)
Pearse Doherty: What was your understanding of the reasons behind this sub-optimal sale?