Gary Gannon (Dublin Central, Social Democrats) | Oireachtas source

At its core this protocol is presented as a modernisation project, an updating of a 1959 convention in order that cross-border co-operation in criminal investigations can function in a world of encrypted phones, cloud storage, cybercrime and increasingly transnational networks. That is a legitimate challenge. Nobody denies that. However, to be clear, we have been given extraordinarily little briefing on the real implications of what we are being asked to sign up to today. When the language is stripped back, this protocol is not just about allowing a Garda detective to send a letter of request more quickly. It is about broadening the legal basis for digital surveillance requests, remote searches, GPS tracking, data interceptions and the sharing of that data between states. If we are being asked to vote on that, then we need a hell of a lot more detail than we have received.

The truth is that every time Ireland opts into a new EU framework on justice co-operation, there is a familiar pattern. There are big promises about efficiency, speed and fighting cybercrime but very little upfront clarity on what safeguards actually exist for people's data or for privacy, proportionality and oversight. That is where I have to place my concerns today. We are being asked to approve a protocol that allows for enhanced co-operation using digital tools that can be extraordinarily intrusive, tools that in another context would rightly trigger debate about surveillance creep, mission drift and large-scale data retention. Yet, we are expected to just sign off and trust that all the appropriate protections are already in place.

However, they are clearly not. Ireland still does not have a comprehensive framework for governing how cross-border digital evidence is collected, retained, stored, accessed or deleted. We do not have clarity on whether data acquired under this protocol could be repurposed for national security claims, a term that is still nowhere defined in Irish law. We do not have adequate transparency mechanisms for the public to understand the scale of surveillance technologies being used.

At a time when the European Court of Justice has repeatedly struck down overly broad data retention laws, the idea that we should simply wave through expanded cross-border data access without scrutiny feels deeply irresponsible. It is impossible to ignore that some of the most consistent and credible warnings on EU digital surveillance frameworks have come from civil liberty organisations. Such groups as the Irish Council for Civil Liberties have spent years reminding both our Government and the EU that rights have not become optional just because technology makes it convenient to overwrite them. These groups highlight that it is not a burden but a democratic obligation.

I want Ireland to play its part in tackling cybercrime and serious organised crime. We absolutely should co-operate with our European partners. However, co-operation cannot mean signing blank cheques or shifting ever more investigative power into international spaces where parliamentary scrutiny becomes weaker and democratic accountability becomes more abstract. Therefore, before we opt into something like this protocol we should be asking basic but essential questions about how data obtained under this protocol will be protected, what oversight body will monitor its use and whether individuals will have any route to challenge misuse. Will Ireland be able to refuse requests that violate our own proportionality standards? What safeguards exist against surveillance powers being stretched beyond their intended purpose? None of these questions have been adequately addressed in the material we were given.

In principle, I support Ireland engaging in modern rights complaints co-operation with our European partners. However, I cannot endorse a system where surveillance capacity expands faster than the safeguards that are supposed to govern it. Ireland is already behind when it comes to digital rights protections. We are already behind on regulating algorithmic decision-making. We are already behind on providing transparency on how law enforcement technology is used in the State. We cannot keep making the same mistake of approving international frameworks first and asking human rights questions later.

My contribution today can be defined simply: if we are serious about protecting both security and civil liberties then we need far more clarity, more safeguards and more democratic oversight than that which has been placed before us. Cross-border co-operation is important but so is the right of every person in the State not to be subjected to digital surveillance without strict legal protections. Until those protections fully articulated, fully costed and fully scrutinised, I believe we should proceed with caution, not rubber stamp endorsement.

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