Enda Kenny (Mayo, Fine Gael)

This motion of no confidence was triggered by the language, extent and depth of the two banking reports. The verdict is in. The evidence has been gathered. The analysis has been made. The conclusion of the two recent reports into our economic crisis is devastatingly clear. Deputy Brian Cowen is guilty of creating an economic disaster that will forever carry the logo, "Made by Fianna Fáil." If he had any integrity he would already have resigned. If he had any respect for the people whose lives he has destroyed he would already have called a general election. However, for him the supreme political virtue, the only virtue, is loyalty to party. He puts that before loyalty to country and people. That is the Fianna Fáil way, but it is not my way.

I stand here today, on behalf of the people whom the Taoiseach has chosen to ignore, to accuse him in their name. I accuse the Taoiseach of being one of the chief architects of our economy's destruction and of condemning our people to a lost decade of unemployment, misery and emigration. I accuse him of hijacking our Republic and handing it over to a toxic circle of bankers, developers and speculators who, like a cancer, have sought to destroy our Republic from the inside out. I accuse him of attempting to deceive the Irish public about the causes of this crisis and his own responsibility for it.

Just over four weeks ago, the Taoiseach delivered two 7,000 word speeches defending his economic record. These speeches can be summarised in four short words, "it's not my fault". That has been the mantra for his entire political career and for the careers of many of his Fianna Fáil colleagues.

When he was Minister for Health, he insisted that his abject failure to reform and improve our health services was not his fault. Working in that Department, he explained, was like working in Angola. When his policies as Minister for Finance helped destroy our economy, he also denied all responsibility. He accepts responsibility for his actions but in doing so he is not prepared to do the necessary and put the matter to the country. It was, he argued, the fault of officials who gave him bad advice or of organisations like the IMF which failed to warn him. He even claimed it was the fault of the Opposition. When he became Taoiseach and our banks collapsed he very quickly identified the fall guy. It was not him or any of his failed policies. It was all the fault of Lehman Brothers. The pattern is clear. The Taoiseach is never there when there is a problem. He is never responsible when there is a failure. He is never to blame when things go wrong.

In all of this, he has shown himself to be a true disciple of his mentor, guide and predecessor, Deputy Bertie Ahern, a man who believed that all the cribbers and moaners, as he called them, should simply commit suicide. He appointed Deputy Cowen as Minister for Finance because he knew he would do whatever his leader required of him. How right he was. From the moment Deputy Cowen became Minister for Finance he did his master's bidding and unleashed a series of reckless policies designed to do one thing and one thing only, to keep Fianna Fáil in power. Deputy Bertie Ahern said his ethics consisted of getting into office and staying in. The record is clear and cannot be denied, even by the Taoiseach. He deliberately over-heated the economy and deliberately pumped up the property bubble.

Over his four budgets, from 2005 to 2008, he increased spending by a massive 51%, more than twice the rate of growth in the economy. To finance this massive spending surge he did everything he could to ensure the property bubble lasted as long as possible. In 2005 he decided to extend massive tax reliefs for property developers past the election in 2007 against expert advice. In 2006, at the peak of the housing boom, he even assured buyers that Irish house prices were based on what he called strong fundamentals.

In his devastating report on the banking crisis Professor Patrick Honohan makes it very clear that this was a home-grown crisis, created and nurtured by the Government. Professor Honohan says, "Macroeconomic and budgetary policies contributed significantly to the economic overheating .....This helped create a climate of public opinion which was led to believe that the party could last forever." That was the impression coming from the Galway tent year after year.

In their report, Klaus Regling and Max Watson also make it clear that the banking crisis "was in crucial ways home-made" and that official policies and banking practices added "fuel to the fire." The report said, "Fiscal policy, bank governance and financial supervision left the economy vulnerable to a deep crisis, with costly and extended social fall-out". How true those words are. By mid-decade "financial stability analysis should have sounded alarm bells loudly." Those alarm bells were ringing for a long time. The Taoiseach claims that no one shouted stop as he set us on the path to ruin, but he knows that is not true. As far back as 2005, the International Monetary Fund told him that house price overvaluation in Ireland "could not just be explained by economic fundamentals". The ESRI warned him that a collapse in the housing market could have "serious" short to medium-term effects on economic growth. As The New York Times looked on in disbelief at what was happening here, under the direction and stewardship of the Taoiseach, it could only describe Ireland as the "wild west of European finance". In 2006, The Economist warned that Ireland was experiencing "the biggest bubble in history". In the same year, Professor Morgan Kelly projected that property prices could fall dramatically, with catastrophic consequences for the banking sector:

We have spent the last five years learning to believe that exports and competitiveness do not matter, and that we can get rich by selling houses to each other. We are likely to spend a painful few years as we unlearn that lesson.

How right Professor Kelly was. In his report, Professor Patrick Honohan lays bare the bunker mentality into which the Government had retreated by 2007. He makes it clear that the conclusions of the financial stability report of that year were based on a "selective reading of the evidence". He states:

The central conclusion regarding a 'soft landing' was not based on any quantitative calculations or analysis. This appears to have been a triumph of hope over reality. More generally, a rather defensive approach was adopted to external critics or contrarians.

The Government was not willing to listen to the warning signs or to heed the alarm bells. It decided to continue with the party as if it would never end. Professor Honohan demolishes the Fianna Fáil line that no one was questioning the Government's policies. He points out that "for years many observers had raised some concerns publicly or privately, albeit sometimes in coded form, about the sustainability of the property boom, which was indeed dramatic by international standards". Fine Gael consistently warned the Government that its mismanagement would lead to disaster. It ignored our warnings and our proposals, which would have halted the destruction.

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