Dr. Barry Colfer:

I wish everybody a good morning. As the Cathaoirleach said, I am director of research at the IIEA. I am also a fellow or teacher in politics at the University of Cambridge where I teach EU law. I also worked previously in the European Parliament. It is always a sincere honour to speak in Leinster House.

Despite my modest experience of working in the European Parliament, I am acutely conscious of the vast experience and years of service by members of this committee, which I commend and by which I am humbled. I am joined by my colleague, Mr. Dylan Marshall, who helped to prepare my notes for which I thank him. The committee will hear from him later.

Members will know that the European Parliament in general and the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, AFCO, in particular, are enthusiastic about treaty reform. In the broad set-up of the institutions, the European Commission represents the interests of the EU and the treaties, the European Council represents the interests of governments and member states and the European Parliament represents the interests of citizens.

However, even within the European Parliament, the AFCO committee has always seen itself as having a specific role in representing citizens, and seeking to ensure the values of the Union are safeguarded. Members often speak in the language of the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law as set out in the preamble and opening articles of the treaty which, I think, come across clearly from these proposals from the AFCO committee regarding treaty reform, which I will speak to in the next five minutes.

These 44 proposals of the AFCO committee are driven as much by instability on Europe's borders as by the prospect of accommodating up to nine new members in an enlarged union, as well as the outcome of the Conference on the Future of Europe, CoFE, process, but also a general inertia at the European Parliament for change. EU integration is often likened to a bike, as I am sure the committee has heard, where if one stops moving forward, even slowly, one will fall over. The AFCO committee has always exuded that view.

The proposals, as I am sure the committee has seen, contain some pretty unremarkable or predictable but still important provisions around institutional reform relating to citizen participation, including referendums, a greater role for the European Parliament in key appointments, greater transparency around the Council's work and the recognition of qualifications cross border. There are, however, some slightly more radical or maybe interesting features. There is a request or demand for a full right of initiative, as legislator, for the European Parliament, changes to qualified majority voting, QMV, and a renewed focus on the environment, biodiversity, energy and defence and passages on migration, which is always contentious, as well as public health. Here, we see the longer term impact of Covid through greater attention to co-operation in the realm of health, which will come as no surprise.

For an Irish audience, there are some special pieces. There are remarks about the prevention of tax havens which might be of particular interest, proposals for QMV on some matters relating to taxation, direct and indirect, but also a small provision around the five-year cycle for the multi-annual financial framework, MFF, to move it from seven years and bring it into sync with the rest of the EU's life cycle.

I will only zoom in on one feature and leave the rest for discussion with the group. That pertains to a social progress protocol, which is both interesting and potentially important in advance of the next round of treaty reforms. It is not new, but it is receiving renewed attention to ensure the "social face" of the Single Market, as the former President of the European Commission, Mr. Jacques Delors, put it.

Under the treaty, the European Union is a social market economy, as Articles 2 and 3 point to, but it is fair to say that the EU has been more market than social for the past 20 years. The proposals seek to address this, as has the current Spanish Presidency and others in recent years, through the idea of the introduction of a social progress protocol. Put simply, the EU's Internal Market and economic policies have been criticised for prioritising market freedoms and competition rules over social and labour standards. A couple of high-profile cases in the European Court of Justice, ECJ, 15 years ago - the Viking and Laval cases - confirmed the pre-eminence of economic freedoms over social rights and the European Parliament's proposals for a social progress protocol seek to correct these perceived imbalances. It was popular in the academic literature in the 1990s following the Maastricht treaty, but the idea that social imperatives and not just economic ones would steer EU law are becoming more popular than they have been for a generation. It may also be an embodiment of lessons learned following the economic and social crisis of 15 years ago, with which all of us here will be familiar. With the increase in support for Euroscepticism around the EU that this precipitated, there is probably more appetite now than for a long time for a social progress protocol to be included in the treaty. It has been long supported by the social partners, the European Economic and Social Committee, EESC, liberals, leftists and some on the centre right in the European Parliament as well.

I will mention briefly proposals around the rule of law. The European Parliament's proposals include proposals to strengthen mechanisms to address shortcomings in the protection of the rule of law by member states under Article 7 of the treaty by removing the unanimity provision for it to work. The irony of this is that it requires unanimity to change the rule around unanimity. It will always be difficult to secure necessary support. Like so much in life, it will be about timing and who is in charge in capitals, but recent shifts in Poland may be important.

Penultimately, I will mention every round of treaty reform has enhanced the role of the European Parliament, moving it from a purely consultative role until the 1970s to being a full co-legislator. The proposals include the provision of the European Parliament to initiate its own laws and have a greater say in major EU appointments. While it is unsurprising and nothing to see, it is mentioning.

Finally, I will say a word on defence, which is probably of more interest here than in other parts of the Union. The proposals call for the establishment of a defence union, including military units and a permanent rapid deployment capacity under the operational command of the Union. It proposes joint procurement financed by the Union through a dedicated budget. It specifically notes that clauses with regard to national traditions of neutrality would not be affected by these changes. This would be expected to intrude on the debate here more so than in other member states.

I am aware that this committee has done much work on enlargement in recent years. From our discussions in different capitals with governments and peer think tanks, the issue of enlargement currently ranks highly, which is not surprising. Most member states are at least nominally in favour of enlargement to Ukraine but some members, including Germany, have stressed the need for institutional reform beforehand to make further enlargement viable, as happened with previous treaties when the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice treaties sought to prepare the way for enlargement. Fundamentally, rules around decision-making would need to change in an enlarged EU, as is always the case. Thus, enlargement and treaty reform, the discussion for today, are essentially interdependent and momentum for enlargement should be expected to spur treaty reform. As such, the Parliament's proposals should be taken seriously.

The challenge for member states in favour of enlargement is the need to bring the public along, of course, and to be honest about the fact that enlargement comes with challenges relating to costs and an inevitable further tilt to the east, as well as advantages. In any debate about treaty reform or enlargement, governments would need to talk about the costs of non-enlargement, as well as the benefits of enlargement in terms of security, arresting Chinese-Russian influence and the EU's credibility on the global stage, among much else, but that is for another day.