Dr. Barry Colfer:

I thank the Senator. It is good to see her again.

On the tilt to the east, I know a bit of eastern Europe very well but do not speak for all of it as it is a very differentiated place. However, let me point to three areas that I expect will become more obvious: social mores, economic imperatives and geography.

On social mores, in eastern Europe there is very often a different relationship with the state than there is here. Some of our fundamental values, including those related to the rights of minorities, are perceived differently. Needless to say – I do not know how to be any less diplomatic – this will intrude on the discussion on eastern enlargement, just as it already does in respect of some of our central and eastern European members.

On the second area, economic imperatives, the most obvious point for me, which I am amazed has not arisen more in the discussion, relates to the Common Agricultural Policy and the future of agriculture. I have already mentioned in passing a paper that Pat Cox produced for the Institute of International and European Affairs, IIEA, on the prospect of Ukrainian accession. It refers to Ukraine having a big agricultural sector and to its being poor. I would be happy to share that paper with members. The impact on the EU’s budget of eastern enlargement, particularly regarding agricultural activity and subsidies to farmers, will be central to any discussions.

On the third area – geography – geography cannot be directly equated with security, but it is partly the case that it can. In this regard, we should bear in mind the regions further to the east. We are basically talking about the Middle East, including Türkiye, and Russia, places that will now be on the EU’s frontier. This brings with it a range of public policy questions that will be perceived differently in eastern Europe than here for reasons of proximity.

On the costs of non-enlargement, I am thankful for the remarks. If I were to have an argument on this, it would boil down to three areas: security; influence or size; and our competitors and rivals. These overlap. It is in the interest of citizens of the European Union, including Ireland, to ensure the bloc we are in is secure and safe. Having a border farther from Ireland plays into that. So, too, does the idea of doing our best not to drive non-EU members into the arms of our competitors or rivals. In this regard, I have mentioned China and Russia, but there are also countries like Iran. The obvious geopolitical case for enlargement is that it is better to have countries in than out, so to speak.

It is remarkable that defence was not raised more. For what it is worth, I agree on the mood change and the very effective consultation forum, which I had the pleasure of attending. Whether these have shifted the debate, time will tell. This week, we are publishing a glossary of terms on security and defence to assist with the public discussion at the IIEA on Ireland’s security and defence posture.

I will make three points to conclude on the matter. There is much interest overseas among our peer think tanks. We are in networks all over the world and we all ask each other questions about our home places. There is genuine interest at present on where Ireland stands on neutrality. While Ireland’s capability in the security and defence space has been well documented as fairly limited, it is changing with the well-documented commission on the future of the Defence Forces. However, that is not really what people are taking an interest in. It is not about Ireland’s capability to contribute to any form of collective European defence, even a nominal one, but about our capacity to defend ourselves and, in so doing, the rest of the EU. Professor Barrett hinted at this. We are not just talking about boats and typical military capacity but also about mathematicians and, obviously, soldiers. Some months ago, I was in a different committee room talking about our well-exposed vulnerabilities related to our subsea cables – another matter the institute has worked on. The debate on Ireland’s security and defence in the EU context will increasingly concern matters of cyber security and the capacity of Ireland to defend itself and the rest of the EU, having regard to our connection to the Internet.

The proposals from the European Parliament, which I meditated on at the start of our meeting, make specific indirect reference to Ireland, Austria and one or two other places, stating that what the European Parliament spoke about in respect of a defence union, a dedicated budget for joint procurement financed by the EU, and various other matters will all be achieved “with regard to national traditions of neutrality”, which would not be affected by the changes. Whatever changes the European Parliament is proposing still account for the now increasingly small number of neutral countries in the bloc.